Knowledge is a source of competitive advantage for organizations but its public good character makes attempts at expropriation difficult to detect and guard against. While prior work has considered legal, economic, and social mechanisms of securing knowledge-based competitive advantage, our contribution lies in identifying how organizations can prevent expropriation of their knowledge by strategically manipulating its manifestations (e.g., routines, blueprints, prototypes, or products). We derive six theoretically distinct types of knowledge manifestation that can be used for these ends, consider their impacts on the awareness, motivation, and capability of a counterparty seeking to expropriate the focal knowledge, and organize them into a novel two-dimensional conceptual framework for comparison. By doing so, we add design mechanisms to the toolbox of isolating mechanisms that can be used strategically to capture value from knowledge. This addition opens up a new channel through which organizations can endogenously shape appropriability regimes and calls scholarly attention to knowledge manifestations as an important unit of analysis for understanding organization, innovation and strategy.
"In competitive markets it is the ease of imitation that determines the sustainability of competitive advantage." (Teece, 1998: 66) Firms exist because they outperform markets in facilitating the sharing, transfer, and integration of individual knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996) . Those that secure privileged access to valuable knowledge 1 have a distinct advantage in the competitive arena: Ricardian and monopoly rents accrue to the extent that rivals can be prevented from expropriating 2 this knowledge (Liebeskind, 1996) . However, the public good character of knowledge makes attempts at imitation difficult to detect and guard against (Liebeskind, 1996; Winter, 1987: 173) .
The traditional tools for securing these rents are the isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984) of legal intellectual property protection (e.g., patents, copyright, trademarks, and trade secrets)
and economic organization, for example, the ownership of specialized complementary assets (Teece, 1986) , and rules of employment, compensation schemes, and structural isolation (Liebeskind, 1997) . 3 Research has suggested that social mechanisms can also serve a similar function (Barney, 1991; Fauchart & von Hippel, 2008; Jonsson & Regnér, 2009; Regnér, 2010) .
Seminal work on profiting from innovation recognized that the appropriability regime for a focal innovation depends not only on the available legal instruments, but also on the nature of the technology (Teece, 1986: 287) , with both factors treated as being outside of the firm's control. Subsequent research has questioned the assumption that a technology's knowledge characteristics are fixed, instead arguing that firms make decisions about how their knowledge is structured and the extent to which it is articulated and codified, with possible implications for its voluntary and involuntary transferability (Winter, 1987) . This line of argument hints at 1 By knowledge here and in the rest of the paper we specifically mean knowledge relating to a focal innovation. 2 While the verb "expropriate" is often used in the context of a government seizing private property, we follow Liebeskind (1996) in using it in accordance with its Merriam-Webster dictionary definition: "to deprive of possession or proprietary rights" (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/expropriate, accessed on 15/10/2018; emphasis added). 3 For a recent review of the literature on how firms capture value from their innovations, see James, Leiblein, & Lu (2013) .
the possibility that firms may make deliberate choices about their technology's design to reduce its imitability (Gans & Stern, 2003: 339) .
This paper takes up the challenge of further developing this theoretical insight and argues that choices made by firms about how the manifestations of knowledge (e.g., a map, blueprint, routine, prototype, or product) are designed can help to deter or punish imitation and thus protect their privileged access to this knowledge. Despite being frequently used and arguably becoming increasingly important in today's digitized and globally inter-connected business landscape, the nature of such design mechanisms and their ability to deter or punish imitation cannot be fully explained by existing theories in strategic management (e.g., Liebeskind, 1997; Rumelt, 1987) , while their omission from work on how firms capture value from their innovations puts the resulting implications for management theory and practice at risk of being incomplete and misleading.
To understand these mechanisms, we draw on the recombinant view of innovation (Fleming, 2001; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Nelson & Winter, 1982) to derive a typology of six conceptually distinct ways that the manifestation of knowledge can be manipulated by design.
We then proceed to theorize links between the use of these design mechanisms and the protection of knowledge-based advantage. Building on the competitive dynamics literature (Chen & Miller, 2012; MacMillan, McCaffery, & van Wijk, 1985) we evaluate the extent to which each of the six mechanisms has the potential to inhibit the awareness, motivation, or capability of a counterparty seeking to imitate the focal knowledge, and the contingencies under which the benefits of using these approaches are likely to outweigh their costs. In focusing in on design choices, we not only question prevailing assumptions about appropriability regimes being exogenously determined (Pisano, 2006) but also add to recent work seeking to reveal new ways in which appropriability regimes might be endogenously shaped by organizations (Ching, Gans, & Stern, 2018; Gans & Stern, 2017) . Our framework contributes to the literatures on organization, strategy, and innovation by expanding the scope of strategies considered for securing knowledge-based advantage and draws scholarly attention to a new unit of analysis for studying the protection and exploitation of knowledge.
KNOWLEDGE MANIFESTATIONS
Loss of privileged access to internally generated knowledge can be very costly. For example, DuPont's process for producing titanium dioxide, which is key to making the colour white and worth billions of dollars, gave it long-running quality and efficiency advantages over its
Chinese rivals (Wilbur, 2016) . Despite DuPont's efforts to protect its production process, the knowledge underpinning it -manifested in blueprints, sketches, and notes -was stolen and sold to these rivals. Recently, the illicit gathering of competitive intelligence by foreign rivals was estimated to cost the US economy between $200-$600bn per year (NBAR, 2017).
Competitive intelligence activities, ranging from the innocuous, such as overhearing conversations in public places, to the clearly illegal, such as theft of well-guarded trade secrets, have long been a part of the competitive toolbox used by organizations (Flax, 1984) . However, the digitization of production is opening up new tools, techniques and pathways to bypass mechanisms designed to prevent industrial and economic espionage (Shih, 2018) . Moreover, the globalization of production means that valuable knowledge is more frequently appearing on the radar of counter-parties who, sometimes with encouragement from their governments, are giving intellectual property rights, such as patents and copyright, less deference, thus reducing the expected value of investing in legal isolation mechanisms (Alcacer, Beukel, & Cassiman, 2017; James et al., 2013) .
Faced with this threat, what can an organization to do to protect its knowledge beyond making the best use of the legal, economic, and social mechanisms available to it? Consider, for example, a cartographer who makes substantial investments to survey a city, produces an accurate map for publication, and registers it for copyright protection, only to find a competing map quickly joining it on the shelves. Did the rival organization behind this competing map carry out their own costly surveying work? Or did they simply plagiarize the first cartographer's work and then release it as their own? Even if the act of plagiarism is illegal under copyright law, a breach is very difficult to prove because: (1) the map is based on an objective reality and thus any two people surveying the same city will find the same streets and produce (substantively) identical maps; and (2) unlike a physical asset, one person's use of a piece of knowledge does not prevent another from consuming/using it (Liebeskind, 1996) . Legal mechanisms alone are then unlikely to protect the knowledge manifested in the cartographer's map from expropriation.
To improve their odds of successfully combating this threat, cartographers insert fictitious entries (e.g., incorrectly named streets, towns or landmarks) into manifestations of their knowledge (maps) in the hope that these entries will be unwittingly replicated by rivals trying to plagiarise the manifestation. Because such "trap streets" are fictitious deviations from reality, their appearance in another map provides credible evidence of a copyright breach 4 and enables the focal firm to (1) identify that a breach has taken place, and (2) effectively seek compensation from the infringing counterparty 5 . Trap streets are not an isolated case. In fact, there are numerous examples of firms strategically manipulating knowledge manifestations in order to frustrate would be imitators, ranging from the use of "development mules" by automobile manufacturers, in which extraneous pieces of panelling are added to new model prototypes during road testing in order to conceal the bodywork design from potential observers from rival firms, through to the now-common modifications and additions to software code 4 The UK's Ordnance Survey has famously used this approach with success in copyright cases. For example, this strategy was credited when the Ordnance Survey won a £20m pay-out from the Automobile Association for copyright infringement in 2001 (Clark, 2001) . 5 Dictionary publishers have also used a similar approach in efforts to protect their copyright (Alford, 2005) , while Swiss cheese producers use specific strains of bacteria that do not change the cheese's texture, smell, or taste but allow it to be identified as genuine by checking for the bacteria's DNA marker (Bosley, 2014). used to monitor and control its use in Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems. We now turn to theorizing the central characteristics of such knowledge manifestations, how they can be targeted for imitation by counterparties, and how they can be designed to prevent knowledge expropriation.
Theorizing Knowledge Manifestations in Organizations
The products and services that organizations produce to create and capture value are manifestations of what they know. Organizational knowledge is special in the sense that it is shared across people, and thus exists beyond one mind. This knowledge can be accumulated (e.g., writing computer code for a program; diagnostic stories that explain machine failure modes), disseminated (e.g., launching a product; sharing of best practices), and preserved (e.g.,
archiving final blueprints for a building; incorporating stories of product success into organizational memory) for organizational ends. This transition from individual to organizational knowledge happens through a process of articulation (e.g., into stories; verbal design briefs; hypotheses) and then, often but not always, codification (e.g., into blueprints; prototypes; manuals) (Håkanson, 2007) . We describe these outputs as manifestations in that they are embodiments of knowledge.
Knowledge, and its manifestations, are 'recombinations' in the sense of Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 130 ) who argue that: "the creation of any sort of novelty in art, science, or practical life-consists to a substantial extent of a recombination of conceptual and physical materials that were previously in existence." Conceptualizing knowledge in this Schumpeterian manner has been central to understanding innovation (Freeman & Soete, 1997) , and is a particularly useful view for us to draw on because this abstraction enables us to clearly discuss how privileged access to knowledge might be secured through the design choices one makes about its manifestation.
A knowledge manifestation can be conceptualized as being made up of knowledge 'components' (Fleming, 2001) . Henderson and Clark's (1990: 11) classic description of a fan's components provides a prototypical example of this approach, explaining that a fan can be understood as being made up of components including "the blade, the motor that drives it, the blade guard, the control system, and the mechanical housing". As such, a fan can then be represented abstractly as five distinct knowledge components (a,b,c,d,e) as in Figure 1 .
-Insert Figure 1 here-
Knowledge Manifestations as Targets for Imitation
The intangibility of knowledge means that rivals are likely to target their imitation attempts at its manifestation(s). For example, in a recent legal complaint 6 by Waymo, Uber Technologies is accused of illicitly accessing and utilizing manifestations of knowledge associated with selfdriving car technology. The vector for these efforts is argued to be a group of senior Waymo employees who, before leaving Waymo for Uber, copied manifestations ranging from lists of specialized suppliers and Statements of Work, through to circuit board design files and reports on the configuration and calibration of the firm's LiDAR sensors. Waymo says its suspicions of illicit imitation were confirmed in December 2016 when a key supplier inadvertently copied a Waymo employee on an email containing designs for Uber's new LiDAR circuit board. The similarities between both company's circuit boards was viewed by Waymo as evidence of Uber's illicit access and imitation of the above knowledge manifestations.
Targeted organizations, such as Waymo, do not, however, have to sit idly by and await these attempts, or hope for accidental emails alerting them to infringement. By strategically manipulating knowledge manifestations before they are accessed, an organization can pre-empt attempts to expropriate its knowledge. Below, we first discuss the conceptual dimensions along which manifestations can be manipulated, before using insights from studies of imitation (Chen & Miller, 2012; Jonsson & Regnér, 2009; MacMillan et al., 1985) to examine how six theoretically distinct types of knowledge manifestation may act as isolating mechanisms by affecting the awareness, motivation, and capability of a counterparty seeking to expropriate the focal knowledge.
The Design of Manifestations
Organizations can manipulate a knowledge manifestation by changing its structure and/or its content such that components are subtracted from or added to the whole, or (some) components are replaced with others. We theorize these changes as being enacted through design choices made along two conceptually distinct dimensions: 1) the completeness of the manifestation;
and 2) the extent to which the manifestation is modified. Taken entirety, making the manifestation an independent and complete embodiment of the knowledge as a whole (e.g., Winter, 1987) . While not considered in prior work, the addition of extraneous components to the manifestation can be important in preventing knowledge expropriation, as we discuss below.
The top row of Figure 2 illustrates how these varying levels of completeness might apply in the case of the fan example presented earlier. While the full manifestation is the same as in Figure 1 , the partial manifestation consists of only three out of the five knowledge components (only the blade, the motor, and the control system, for example). The augmented manifestation, on the other hand, contains all of the knowledge components of the full manifestation, but also includes extraneous knowledge components y and z. These extraneous components are added for reasons of protection rather than functionality or aesthetics (e.g., the addition of an audio watermark, Natgunanathan, Xiang, Hua, Beliakov, & Yearwood, 2017) . and control system used as a feint).
-Insert Figure 2 here-
DESIGNING KNOWLEDGE MANIFESTATIONS TO SECURE KNOWLEDGE-BASED COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
The above typology provides a systematic way of classifying and distinguishing between different ways of manipulating knowledge manifestations but does not enable us to theorize how these choices might affect an organization's ability to secure knowledge-based competitive advantage. Without this step, our approach is descriptively useful, but lacks explanatory or predictive power concerning the desirability of a given strategy. We draw on the Awareness, Motivation, and Capability (AMC) framework from the competitive dynamics literature (for a review, see Chen & Miller, 2012) to take this next step. This perspective argues that for a counterparty to respond to a competitive action (e.g., development of a new product) they must be aware of the action taking place and of its content, have sufficient belief in the benefits of responding to the action to be motivated to pursue a response, and possess the capabilities necessary to effectively execute the response. These considerations have been shown to influence the likelihood and speed of competitor imitation in prior work (Jonsson & Regnér, 2009; MacMillan et al., 1985) and enable us to theorize about whether a counterparty will engage in imitating a knowledge manifestation developed by the focal firm.
We argue that different types of knowledge manifestations -generated by varying a manifestation's completeness and modification -could shape counterparty awareness of the focal knowledge, the counterparty's motivation to pursue efforts to imitate this knowledge, and the level of counterparty capability required to achieve success in such imitation efforts. Table   1 provides an overview of how the different ways of manipulating knowledge manifestations described above can be proactively used by an organization to secure its privileged access to knowledge. Following the same pattern as Figure 2 , the first row of the table concerns unmodified manifestations of varying completeness and the second row corresponds to modified manifestations. The columns, on the other hand, capture the completeness of the manifestation, increasing from partial in the left column, to full in the central column, to augmented in the right column.
-Insert (Winterthur, 2011) . Furthermore, an effect of using these knowledge manifestations (with the exception of ground staking) is likely to be an increase in the difficulty of not only involuntary, but also intended knowledge transfer and collaboration (Liebeskind, 1996 (Liebeskind, , 1997 Winter, 1987) , potentially resulting in lower innovation performance (Wadhwa, Bodas Freitas, & Sarkar, 2017) . As we will discuss below, use of certain kinds of manifestations may also create risks for the firm's reputation, and possibly even backfire by unintentionally inspiring rivals' innovation efforts. As a result of this, whether or not the benefits of using a particular kind of manifestation design are likely to outweigh its costs will be contingent on a number of factors including the characteristics of the underlying knowledge that may constrain the extent to which it can be concealed or modified through design, whether or not the focal manifestation is intended for commercialization, and whether or not the firm faces a clear imitation threat from a specific rival. We now turn to discussing the benefits and costs of each kind of manifestation design and the contingencies under which the former is likely to outweigh the latter, with Figure   3 providing an overview of these considerations in a decision flowchart.
-Insert Figure 3 hereOur starting point is that use of one or more of the proposed manifestation designs will in most cases be complementary to the use of legal, economic, and social isolating mechanisms discussed in prior work. However, the first contingency to consider is whether or not the effectiveness of available legal or social isolating mechanisms is so high as to make the additional use of design mechanisms redundant. In such cases, revealing an unadulterated manifestation (Table 1 , central cell, top row) can be sufficient to establish an enforceable claim to intellectual property. Ground staking of this kind is an important part of systems for establishing forms of legal intellectual property rights (e.g., patents, copyright), but is also used to create social claims to knowledge, such as with the publication of scientific articles by researchers. Despite raising counterparty awareness of the focal knowledge, ground staking can prevent the illicit replication of the knowledge manifestation when a community recognises the claim as legitimate and can successfully detect and sanction transgressions, so reducing the motivation of the counterparty to proceed with an expropriation attempt (e.g., the publication of recipes by French chefs, see Fauchart & von Hippel, 2008) , or when the counter-party is embedded in institutional norms and values that make them unwilling to imitate, despite being aware of the focal knowledge and capable of its imitation (Jonsson & Regnér, 2009; Regnér, 2010) .
Such legal or social isolating mechanisms alone are likely to be highly effective only in a small number of cases (e.g., legal intellectual property rights in the medical instrument and pharmaceutical industries, Arora, Ceccagnoli, & Cohen (2008) ; see also Alcacer et al., (2017) and James et al., (2013) ). If the risk of raising awareness by revealing the complete, unmodified manifestation is judged to be too high, and not to be sufficiently offset by the expected reduction in counterparty motivation due to the threat of legal or social sanctions, additional protections can be built into the manifestation's design. For example, extraneous components (Table 1 , topright cell) can be added to the manifestation in order to assert an organization's claims to its intellectual property in case of its unsanctioned replication by others. Such tagging, often using watermarks or similar approaches (e.g., for audio watermarks, see Natgunanathan et al., 2017) , is frequently used to establish ownership of intellectual property codified in text and images, with further examples including the previously-mentioned use of "trap streets" by cartographers and the addition of specific bacteria strains to genuine Swiss Emmentaler cheese that do not change its texture, smell, or taste, but allow counterfeit Emmentaler to be identified if the bacteria's DNA marker is not present (Bosley, 2014) . 7 This strategy relies on the extraneous "tag" being either difficult to detect and/or remove for a potential rival, or difficult to replicate.
A counterparty's motivation to mount an expropriation attempt will be reduced to the extent that the tag increases the potential for the expropriated party, or those acting in its interests, to effectively pursue sanctions against the expropriator.
The next contingency to consider is whether or not the focal manifestation will be commercialized 8 . Making the manifestation available to customers will mean significant limitations on the extent to which its observability in use can be controlled by the originating 7 Interestingly, similar approaches are also used to assert ownership of other kinds of physical property, ranging from the branding of livestock to Data Dots, which can be used to prove ownership of cars and other high-value goods. 8 For the sake of brevity, we use "commercialize" here in its most general sense. It should be interpreted as referring to any good or service being made publicly available for purchase or use. firm due to counterparties being able to examine the manifestation at their leisure (Liebeskind, 1997; Teece, 1998) . In this case, a design option that is likely to be effective in reducing counterparty awareness of the underlying knowledge would be the use of a modified, complete target manifestation (Table 1 , central cell, bottom row). Such a manifestation can be effective by requiring that the observer possess additional knowledge or technology that is needed to translate the target manifestation into the original manifestation. Its use thus not only decreases counterparty awareness of the focal knowledge, but also raises the level of capability required for its effective imitation. Obfuscation of this kind has a long history of usage in cryptography in the form of common cyphers, which can be used to encode information through, for example, character substitution. In recent decades, it has also become common practice in software development to use compilers to transform programming logic into uninterpretable but functional machine code, thus preventing reverse engineering (Gans & Stern, 2003: 339) . While the above examples demonstrate the usefulness of this approach when the manifestation takes the form of information or software code, using such an approach in the design of a physical product is likely to be more problematic. This is due to the greater difficulty of achieving hardware product functionality without revealing the underlying mechanics, although the increasing use of software controls in hardware products may provide the opportunity to do this in some cases.
One further design option that may be used for a commercialized manifestation is spiking the manifestation with an augmented component that either "locks" its replication or alteration by the purchaser, or, once replicated or altered, causes the manifestation to cease functioning if certain conditions are (or are not) met (Table 1 , bottom right cell). To succeed in imitation efforts targeting this kind of manifestation, the counterparty must have the capabilities to identify the spiking component and to neutralize its effects. In contrast to the tagging approach previously discussed, spiking requires both the addition of extraneous components to the manifestation, as well as a modification to its functional components to alter their functionality if certain conditions are (not) met. It can be found in use by the majority of Digital Rights Management approaches, which add code to digital media that prevent it from being copied onto, or operating on, devices for which its use has not been sanctioned, and by software developers who add code to trial software that stops it functioning if a purchase is not made.
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The usability of this approach outside of software applications is increasing with the rise of "connected" products (Porter & Heppelmann, 2014) , with an example being John Deere tractors using software to restrict users' ability to repair their purchased equipment outside of an authorized service centre (Bloomberg, 2017) . If none of the above contingencies required for the approaches discussed to be effective are met, the knowledge in question is likely only to be protectable using economic isolating mechanisms.
For manifestations that are not designed to be commercialized but are instead intermediate steps in the innovation or production process, additional design options may be used. Designing such a manifestation to reduce counterparty awareness of the targeted knowledge can contribute towards protecting competitive advantage by making it harder for a counterparty to identify what needs to be imitated (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993 ; also, cf. role of causal ambiguity in Barney, 1991; role of visibility in MacMillan et al., 1985) . This effect can be obtained when a manipulation (subtraction, addition or modification) of the target manifestation enables all (or part) of its nature to be obscured and thus made unintelligible or unobservable to potential counterparties.
The use of "development mules" by automotive producers provides a useful illustration of how such a strategy can be used to reduce counterparty awareness and thus the probability of successful imitation. Automotive firms road test new vehicle prototypes in order to validate engineering decisions made under less realistic experimental conditions. However, because these tests must occur in public they expose the innovation to observation by rivals and to potential attempts at imitation. In order to guard against this risk, additional materials (e.g., panels, tape and paint) are commonly fitted to the prototype's exterior to obscure its nature from observers, allowing it to be road tested with less risk that the knowledge manifested in the vehicle's bodywork design will be revealed. The additional knowledge component(s) in this case are extraneous in the sense that their only function is to protect the knowledge manifestation from imitation. The use of development mules is an example where the knowledge manifestation content itself is unchanged, but manipulation of its structure creates a protective effect. In this case, the structural change was an augmentation to the manifestation that generates a cloaking effect (Table 1 , top-right cell). This way of manipulating a knowledge manifestation provides protection by obscuring the information required for a counterparty to reach the level of awareness necessary to successfully target the focal knowledge for imitation.
Augmentation is not the only way to design a manifestation's structure to reduce counterparty awareness of the focal knowledge. Instead of augmenting the complete manifestation, elements can be subtracted from it, thus revealing only part of its totality to a counterparty. Furthermore, component-level collaboration or coordination can take place, provided that the underlying knowledge is sufficiently decomposable so as that the partial manifestation will still be useful, while limiting the discloser's vulnerability to knowledge expropriation by collaborating parties (Table 1 , top-left cell). This practice has been documented in broadcast search efforts (e.g., Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013; Henkel, Schöberl, & Alexy, 2014) and is also commonly observed in supply chains involving parties based in countries with weak appropriability regimes in which careful coordination is prudent (e.g., Henkel, Baldwin, & Shih, 2013) . For example, an organization sourcing from Chinese manufacturers may send designs for different components of its product to be built by different manufacturers but keep the totality (the system level manifestation) to itself and thus perform assembly and quality assurance in-house to reduce the likelihood of any of the manufacturers introducing a rival product. A similar approach to modularising knowledge has been argued to be useful in preventing knowledge from being imitated during the production process (Baldwin & Henkel, 2015) , and in enabling the appropriation of knowledge generated at research and development sites in countries with weak protections for intellectual property rights (Zhao, 2006) .
The final two types of manifestation are most likely to be useful if targeted at a specific counterparty that the firm has reason to believe is actively engaged in efforts to expropriate its knowledge. Given that the risks of these approaches are likely to outweigh their benefits if this is not the case, reliance solely on economic isolating mechanisms may be the best option if none of the contingencies discussed above are met.
Modification of a partial manifestation can provide the means to influence a counterparty's awareness of the target to the extent that it disrupts, confuses and complicates the interpretive process that underpins imitation efforts. A modified, partially complete, manifestation (Table 1 , bottom-left cell) can obscure the true nature of a manifestation and act as a strategic feint (Hendricks & McAfee, 2006) that misdirects a counterparty's sense-making efforts. Such feinting refocuses a counterparty's awareness, and its corresponding time, resources, and attention on the wrong imitation target and thus may provide the focal firm with a degree of protection. This practice can be seen in cases such as the use of fake surveys by a group of oil producers to mislead its rival Standard Oil regarding the producers' efforts to build the Tidewater pipeline (Hendricks & McAfee, 2006) . By revealing that a pipeline was being planned but drawing Standard Oil's attention to locations that were, in fact, not going to be used for the pipeline, the producer group succeeded in preventing Standard Oil from blocking off the pipeline's intended route, and, once the pipeline was built, in breaking Standard Oil's regional oil transportation monopoly. Other examples include the UK's Ministry of Information telling the press during World War II that the success of British pilots in night-time aerial combat was due to their carrot-rich diet, thus hoping to keep attention away from radar technology, the true cause of the Royal Air Force's advantage (Smith, 2013) , or the use of decoy patents in a variety of industries (Langinier, 2001) , in which firms file a patent for a technological component known to be less effective than the actual component used by the filing organization in the hope of triggering rival investment in technology paths of limited promise. This strategy can be an effective way of inhibiting the imitation of a given manifestation to the extent that a rival a) views the partial, modified manifestation as credible, and b) allocates resources and attention to imitating it that would otherwise be used in efforts to imitate the original manifestation. One potential cost of using such an approach is that it may also mislead customers and partner organizations, thus potentially damaging the organization's reputation with these stakeholders.
A further risk is that the feint may unintentionally inspire the counterparty to pursue an innovation trajectory that, while of little value to the originating organization, may be valuable to the counterparty, given its resources and absorptive capacity.
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Finally, manifestations can be strategically manipulated by modifying parts of a complete manifestation (Table 1 , bottom row, middle cell) in order to sabotage attempts at imitation. Counterparties attempting to imitate such a manifestation must have the capabilities required to carefully unwind the modifications made or face the prospect of accruing non-trivial costs of building the capability to do so. Such modifications thus reduce the mobility of the targeted knowledge (Peteraf, 1993; Rumelt, 1987; Williamson, 1975 ) and make imitation difficult. Examples of such sabotage include the leaking of faulty pipeline control software to the USSR by the CIA, leading to a pipeline explosion (Reed, 2005) , and apparently intentional errors in the blueprints that Charles Babbage created for his Difference Engine that seem to have been designed to foil suspected industrial espionage efforts (BBC, 2000) . As suggested by the first example, this approach has the potential of causing significant damage to a counterparty, so its likely reputational and even legal ramifications should be carefully considered.
DISCUSSION
In competitive markets, the design choices organizations make about the manifestation of knowledge shape the imitability and thus the sustainability of their competitive advantage. The influence on imitation flows from the way these choices influence the awareness, motivation, and capability of counterparties who might seek to expropriate focal knowledge. This insight extends our understanding of the isolating mechanisms available for securing knowledge-based competitive advantage beyond the legal, economic, and social mechanisms considered in prior work (e.g., Barney, 1991; Fauchart & von Hippel, 2008; Jonsson & Regnér, 2009; Liebeskind, 1996 Liebeskind, , 1997 Regnér, 2010; Rumelt, 1987; Teece, 1986) . In doing so, we shine a light on an additional family of mechanisms that can be used to endogenously shape the appropriability regime for a given innovation, going beyond the approaches discussed in recent work on this topic (Ching et al., 2018; Gans & Stern, 2017; Pisano, 2006) . Specifically, we show that, beyond strategically using legal isolating mechanisms to weaken the appropriability regimes facing upstream suppliers (Pisano, 2006) , or choosing to invest in capability development rather than in legal isolating mechanisms (Ching et al., 2018; Gans & Stern, 2017) , design mechanisms are an important class of tools that firms can use to endogenously shape appropriability regimes.
The design mechanisms identified appear to be used commonly across disparate fields of application but have so far gone untheorized by scholars of strategy, innovation and organization. Beyond the importance of theorizing the nature of these mechanisms in and of itself, we see our paper as making three related contributions to the literature.
Firstly, by theorizing the design choices associated with manifesting knowledge and linking this choice to likelihood of imitation by a counterparty, we hope to broaden scholarly attention from theorizing the effects of whether knowledge associated with an innovation is articulated and codified, to considering how this is done and the implications it holds for value capture. Our paper provides a framework for pursuing these questions and causal logic for why an organization might be able to gain competitive advantage from the "clever, unique" ways that they articulate and codify knowledge (Hedlund, 1994: 76) . The scope for organizations to get "clever" about this process has only expanded with the digitization of commerce and production, which has led to an explosion of new ways organizations can articulate and codify the knowledge underpinning innovation (e.g., laser scanning; virtual reality; blockchain).
Design mechanisms can be used to help isolate this knowledge from imitation and thus provide a new causal logic to resist the temptation of dismissing "codified knowledge as being (automatically) easily imitated, hence, unable to provide competitive advantage and, hence, uninteresting." (Håkanson, 2007: 80) . Much like the codification of knowledge, the arguments advanced herein suggest that the specific choices organizations make about how to manifest their knowledge are amongst the most interesting and understudied by scholars of innovation, strategy and management.
Secondly, our paper's typology and flowchart provide a systematic way of collecting data about the use of design mechanisms for capturing value from innovation. It will now be easier to sample, parse, code and analyze potentially relevant primary and secondary data. For example, surveys designed to collect primary data on managerial practice have played a central role in shaping our knowledge of appropriability mechanisms (e.g., Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, & Winter, 1987) and adding survey items on design mechanisms would help further expand our empirical knowledge of when and how organizations capture value from innovation (James et al., 2013) . The other main empirical route we see for expanding existing knowledge is through the secondary data stemming from litigation. This type of data reflects a clear choice to "leverage the firm's property rights for strategic gain" (Graham & Somaya, 2006: 15) and in doing so, litigation requires the organization to reveal otherwise difficult to observe choices about the use of design mechanisms and how they may be used to complement or substitute social, economic or legal mechanisms. For example, in bringing their case for copyright breach against the Automobile Association, the UK Ordinance Office's revealed their use of "trap streets" to buttress the copyright protection provided to their maps (see Clark, 2001) . With global court records becoming increasingly digitized and accessible, litigation offers a useful new way of capturing rich secondary data on how organizations deploy isolating mechanisms to profit from innovation.
Thirdly, data on design mechanisms will mean that scholars can begin systematically studying if, when, and how these mechanisms might complement or substitute other types of isolating mechanisms. As Somaya (2012) explains, although tools like patents and secrecy have traditionally been treated as substitutes, in practice firms combine multiple isolating mechanisms to in an effort to optimize the value captured from a given innovation. This insight is particularly important for scholars seeking to identify a causal relationship between a given isolating mechanism and value capture. For example, a firm's ability to capture value from software through copyright protection (e.g., Teece, 1998: 57) should be fundamentally influenced by whether they can deploy complementary design mechanisms, such the "Trap Street" approach used by Encyclopedia and Dictionary publishers (Alford, 2005) or logic bombs (McGaughey et al., 2000) . Failure to take all potential isolating mechanisms into account puts studies seeking to evaluate the effectiveness of a particular set of isolating mechanisms at risk of suffering from omitted variable bias, and potentially of making recommendations for management theory and practice that are based on a partial and inaccurate understanding of the strategies that firms use to capture value from their innovations. Our identification of design mechanisms reveals a new channel through which this bias might occur and provides a framework for theorizing about and collecting data on this causal link.
Limitations
As with other forms of intellectual property protection (Somaya, 2012) , there are likely to be tradeoffs between the use of the different kinds of knowledge manifestations in terms of the risks involved. Such risks may range from enabling reverse engineering or counter-party innovation, to negative reputational effects or increases in the costs of knowledge replication for the organization's own uses.
For example, consider US Steel who claims to have had gigabytes of data on their trade secrets associated with advanced steel manufacturing stolen through hacking by Chinese competitors (Geewax, 2016) . Suspecting that such efforts may be underway, US Steel could pursue a strategy of sabotage to help protect its next generation of technology. To do so, those responsible for their technology could partially modify a given target manifestation so that it is designed to either fail or have sub-optimal performance in-use. The Chinese competitors, having not developed this technology themselves, are unlikely to have the capability required to easily detect and rectify any modification. As a result, their progress along the experience curve will be delayed, higher imitation costs will be incurred, and they will have to develop new procedures for assuring the fidelity of the manifestations they illicitly acquire. This outcome will be to US Steel's advantage. However, the sabotage strategy will not be without cost and risk for US Steel. Modifying the original manifestation will cost engineering hours, while also introducing the challenge of assuring that US Steel itself does not confuse the modified and original manifestation.
The costs of strategically designing manifestations in the fashion suggested above are therefore likely to increase with organizational size and complexity. Pursuing such approaches may well have additional longer-term costs in terms of increasing the demands placed on boundedly-rational managers who will need to make decisions about which knowledge to protect using these approaches and which design choices should be used to do this, and perhaps may even make the organization a less attractive potential employer for those who subscribe to norms of openness (Wadhwa et al., 2017 ). While we have made a first attempt to consider the likely tradeoffs between these risks and the benefits for each approach, careful empirical work focused on specific approaches will be essential to further elaborate and test these boundary conditions.
CONCLUSION
Some of the motivations discussed above arguably paint a malevolent, or at least cutthroat, view of the competitive dynamics that characterize organizational life. This is an aspect of the environment often assumed away by scholars in our field (MacAulay, Steen, & Kastelle, 2017) .
However, as we illustrate above, these conditions describe salient aspects of the competitive landscape facing managers and we believe they deserve more scholarly attention in studies of strategy, management and innovation. While it may be argued that effort spent on using the design mechanisms proposed above could be put to better use in generating innovations, designing knowledge manifestations may be one way for managers to secure their knowledgebased competitive advantage against counter-parties prepared to break the rules to win, thus increasing their incentives to invest in innovation. Knowledge manifestations thus provide an essential new unit of analysis for expanding our understanding of competitive strategy to encompass long-used practices that are only becoming more important in today's increasingly digitalized and multinational business landscape. 
